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1. Introduction 
 The last decade marked a significant change in the European Union‟s approach 
towards terrorism. As a result of terrorist attacks (9/11, Madrid and London) the EU terrorism 
policy turned from a counter-terrorism approach, stressing repressive efforts targeting an 
outside threat, towards a counter-radicalization approach, targeting domestic radicalization 
processes. Led by the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, the latter approach based itself 
on a homegrown dimension of terrorism in which identification and resolving underlying 
causes of radicalization took center stage (Coolsaet 2012, 868). This shift was quite a 
significant one, since it influenced the traditional sovereignty of member states to deal with 
these issues themselves (Coolsaet 2012, 689). 
 This so-called “counter-radicalization turn” of the EU led to a call for research and 
expertise. Therefore, a number of expert networks and forums were established with the 
objective to inform and advise the Commission on policy. There are, however, three 
interesting events that pose questions about the role and function of these experts in the 
European Union. First, not all terrorism experts in these networks were characterized by a 
traditional security profile, but instead included civil society experts, academics, and 
interior/integration ministry personnel. Second, there was a notable discrepancy in the timing 
of these expert groups, as the European Commission had established its official line of policy 
in 2004-2005 and most of the reports were issued a few years later. And last, the Commission 
discarded one of the reports because it took a critical stance against EU‟s counter-terrorism 
policy (Bossong 2012, 6).  
To provide an answer for the role and function of expert networks in the European 
Union, this study will build on the paper Five accounts of the "making of a terrorist": A 
micro-political sociology of EU experts on radicalisation written by Francesco Ragazzi 
(2013).
1
 It starts by providing conventional interpretations on transnational expert groups: 
first, the “propagandist” interpretation, which argues that experts primarily serve a function of 
propaganda of governing elites; second, an “epistemic community” interpretation, which 
identifies experts as a homogeneous and independent body of knowledge and strategy. The 
third and central hypothesis is based on a Bourdieusian sociology. It argues that European 
terrorism expertise can best be interpreted as a “field” in which a heterogeneous group of 
experts struggle for the legitimate classification of violent-radicalization as well as the best 
practices to prevent it from taking place. In this case the European field of expertise can best 
be interpreted as a “weak field,” that is, a field that is largely dominated by neighboring fields 
that are constituted more firmly, allowing agents to access it for personal strategy.  
                                                        
1 Many thanks to Francesco Ragazzi for allowing me to adopt and extend his study for my bachelor thesis. 
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Multiple expert networks will be explored for the purpose of analyzing the role of 
these experts in the European Union: The Policy Planner‟s Network on Counter 
Radicalization (PPN), the European Commission‟s Expert Groups on Violent Radicalization 
(ECEGVR), the Change Institute, The Center for European Integration Strategies (CEIS) and 
the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICR) based at 
Kings College in London. Most of the data for the expert networks in this study are derived 
from Francesco Ragazzi's (2013) original paper. The main contribution of this study is the 
expert network PPN, of which the inclusion should be seen as an attempt to extend and 
possibly complement the findings of the original study. 
Besides offering an interpretation of expert networks in the EU, another objective of 
this study is to provide an alternative way for analyzing European expert networks using the 
theoretical framework of a Bourdieusian sociology. It promotes a micro-sociological 
approach, using methodology that enables a relational analysis. The aim is to analyze the 
stances (position-takings) of expert networks in relation to the positions they occupy in the 
field of expertise. The data collected for this study consists of stances externalized in the 
expert network reports as well as biographical data collected from the responsible authors. 
The analysis consists of two parts. The first part maps expert stances on the process of 
radicalization using Factorial Correspondence Analysis. It allows one to draw a conclusion on 
the question whether the propagandist and epistemic community interpretations of experts can 
be discarded or not. The second part includes an analysis of the social positions of experts, 
first by analysis of the relative social capitals using a Social Network Analysis, and then by 
mapping capitals on a visual plane using a Multiple Correspondence Analysis.  
 
2. Counter-radicalization and expertise in the European Union 
Dealing with terrorism issues at the level of the European Union (EU) took a long 
time to develop. Although treaties and organizations at the European level facilitated 
coordination and information sharing among member-states, terrorism policy long remained a 
national issue (Coolsaet 2010, 857). However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and the 
Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 significantly boosted Europe‟s cooperation 
and political integration on the issue of terrorism (Coolsaet 2010, 858). This increase in 
cooperation coincided with a shift in the European approach to terrorism. Traditionally the 
terrorist discourse in the EU was framed as a security issue. However, with the advocacy of 
member states (in particular the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) the European approach 
changed from a counter-terrorism strategy, which focused on repressive measures towards 
terrorism as an external threat, towards a strategy of prevention, which focused on the 
underlying factors that can lead to acts of terrorism (Coolsaet 2010, 860).  
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The so-called “violent radicalization turn” in the EU marked a significant change. As 
Coolsaet (2010, 689) notes: “Without fully realizing it, the EU thus found itself in new and 
uncharted territory, since the issue clearly impinged upon national sovereignty by going to the 
heart of political, social and cultural differences among member-states. From the start, 
radicalization was essentially intertwined with issues of integration, social policy, multi-
culturalism and the representation of minority groups.” Consequently, there was a need for 
more knowledge and expertise, both to inform on the nature of the threat as well as advise on 
the best practices to prevent violent-radicalization from taking place (Bossong 2012, 868-9).  
However, some peculiar facts can be observed in the context of EU terrorism 
expertise. First, many of the experts that were appointed to provide information and advice 
the Commission on the issue of radicalization did not derive from the field of security, which 
is a profile that traditionally matched terrorism expertise. Second, expert networks and their 
reports were commissioned around the year 2008. However, EU documents of 2004 and 2005 
had already established the “existence” of radicalization, the factors leading to it, and the 
most efficient course of action (Ragazzi 2013, 6). And last, the Commission rejected the 
concluding reports from the European Commission Expert Group on Violent Radicalization 
(ECEGVR) because it provided a critical stance by shunning a concept of violent-
radicalization and detailed policy advice (Bossong 2012, 6). 
These peculiarities pose a question on the role and function of these experts in the 
context of the “counter-radicalization turn” of the European Union. Although this may be a 
peripheral case, this study contends that a micro-sociological analysis of experts in line with a 
Bourdieusian sociology allows for insight on the underlying logics of European expertise. A 
few cases will be explored for this purpose. First, the European Commission’s Expert Group 
on Violent Radicalization (ECEGVR), appointed in April 2006 by EU commissioner Franco 
Frattini. The group consisted of academics from multiple EU member states that served as a 
policy advisory group (Coolsaet 2010, 869). Second, Policy Planners Network on countering 
Polarisation and Radicalization (PPN) established in 2008 by an initiative of the UK and the 
Netherlands. It consists of informal group of multiple member-state. Its members consisted 
for a large part of ministry-related personnel.
2
 Furthermore, four expert reports that were 
ordered by the Commission: “The beliefs, Ideologies and Narratives of Violent Radicalization” 
and “Best practices in cooperation between authorities and civil society with a view to the 
prevention and response to violent radicalisation” commissioned to the think tank Change 
Institute (The Change Institute 2008b; 2008a), “Factors of creation or modification of violent 
radicalization processes, particularly among the youth”, commissioned to the CEIS, a 
Brussels based think tank, and “Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamist Militant 
                                                        
2 http://www.strategicdialogue.org/programmes/counter-extremism/ppn/ 
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Movement in Europe”, commissioned to the International Centre for the Study of 
Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) based at Kings College, in London. 
 
3. A weak field of EU terrorism expertise 
There are a number of hypotheses that could explain the role of terrorism expertise in 
the European Union. The first hypothesis is based on the so-called “propagandist” approach. 
It suggests that experts systematically reproduce governmental security frames and thus have 
a function of justification (Burnett and Whyte 2005, 13-14). Mueller (2006, 29), for instance, 
argues that terrorist experts are part of a “terrorism industry”, where they systematically align 
themselves with a politics of fear set out by governing elites. These cynical accounts may find 
audience within general public, media or activist circles (Ragazzi 2013, 2), but might 
arguably also share some common ground with Intergovernmentalist literature by underlining 
a primary role of nation-states (Kauppi 2003, 776). This study criticizes, however, that the 
propagandist argument neglects an independent part played by terrorism experts; it deprives 
experts from having agency and rules out the possibility of a multiplicity of positions they 
might adopt (Ragazzi 2013, 2).  
Because it forms an important part in the literature on European governance, the 
second hypothesis argues that European terrorism experts may constitute an “epistemic 
community”. Building on the definition of Peter Haas (1992, 3), an epistemic community is 
defined as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain 
or issue area.” In order to be considered an epistemic community, experts are assumed to 
share four properties: first, principled beliefs about what is considered the right course of 
social and political action; second, causal beliefs about social and political phenomena; third, 
notions of validity about accepted and neutral knowledge; and last, a common policy 
enterprise (Cross Davis 2011, 19-20). In the European context, for example, Mai‟a Cross 
Davis (2011) contends that experts can serve as a pro-active knowledge based network to 
advance policy options. In her analysis on the epistemic community of Coreper diplomats 
experts are argued to have transcended its formal task of preparing work for the council, 
hereby pushing the issue of radicalization on the agenda of the European Union (Cross Davis 
2011, 109).  
The epistemic community hypothesis is valued for its emphasis on an independent 
part played by terrorism experts, thereby departing from a submissive and state-centric 
account provided by the propagandist hypothesis. Moreover, the epistemic community thesis 
takes into account the role of values and social norms, the process of socialization and social 
learning among institutions, and adds a notion of the social construction of knowledge (Cross 
Davis 2013, 141-142). However, one could question the fact that in the epistemic community 
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thesis experts are treated as a unitary and independent group of actors, persuading others – 
mostly governing elites – through an instrumental deployment of knowledge (Epstein 2013, 
168). This study argues that, through this largely functionalist perspective of politics, the 
epistemic community thesis severely generalizes and de-contextualizes contents as it ignores 
the social characteristics and conflicting strategies of experts involved (Dezalay and Madsen 
2008, 4; Cross Davis 2013, 145-146).  
In order to give an alternative interpretation of terrorism expertise that takes into 
account the deficiencies of both the propagandist and epistemic community thesis, this study 
proposes a more sociological account of terrorism experts in the EU. Building on Francesco 
Ragazzi's (2013) exploratory paper, this study uses a theoretical framework developed by the 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and recent developments in International Political 
Sociology and sociological approaches to the EU. This Bourdieusian hypothesis argues that 
EU terrorism expertise can best be understood as a “weak field” in which a variety of actors, 
holding unequal proportions of capital, compete for the legitimate characterization of violent-
radicalization as well as the best practices for counter-radicalization.  
Although it may share some of their conclusions, the Bourdieusian theoretical 
framework is not bound to the theoretical underpinning of most International Relations 
research models on expert networks (e.g. rationalism for the propagandist approach or 
constructivism in epistemic communities thesis). What is central for a Bourdieusian approach 
is neither instrumental rationality nor adherence to social norms; actors base their actions 
instead “on the dispositions that they have been crafted over time (habitus) which, at the point 
of intersect with their socially defined positions (in the field), are actualized in the form of 
practices” (Pouliot and Mérand 2013, 31).  
Stances (position-takings in Bourdieusian terms) are mostly a reflection of an experts‟ 
position in the field, which are the result of a unique trajectory through different fields (Bigo 
2011, 241). As these fields contain different “rules of the game”, they are incorporated in 
agents‟ dispositions (habitus), ultimately defining their interests (illusio) and strategies 
(Pouliot and Mérand 2013, 33). In other words, a Bourdieusian approach suggests that stances 
must be analyzed through the positions experts occupy in the field in order to get a grasp the 
underlying structural order of the European field of expertise. This has implications for the 
object of “knowledge” and “expertise”, which in the case of European terrorism expertise 
could be analyzed as a stake in a struggle to legitimately define the legitimate security logic 
(Berling 2013, 68).
3
  
                                                        
3 This “reflexive” account of knowledge is what distinguishes a Bourdieusian approach from an epistemic community approach. 
The former approach takes knowledge as a stake in a social struggle for power, whereas the latter analyzes knowledge more from 
an instrumental point of view, i.e. as a “capability” to bring about change (Epstein 2013, 168).  
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In contrast to the propagandist approach, therefore, the Bourdieusian hypothesis 
argues that terrorism experts do not necessarily align themselves with governments due to the 
fact that both governing elites and experts are positioned in different fields. In other words, 
because they operate in their own specific fields, they are exposed to different “rules of the 
game” and therefore have a different illusio. In similar vein, arguing against the epistemic 
community thesis, the Bourdieusian approach argues that European terrorism experts do not 
necessarily form a common body of knowledge with shared strategies; expert might well 
share some of the characteristics outlined above (principled beliefs, causal beliefs, notions of 
validity, a common policy enterprise) but are seldom as homogeneous and autonomous as the 
epistemic community thesis would suggest. Instead, it is argued that expert stances and 
strategies are structured by a variety of incorporated dispositions, which is the result of 
specific trajectory in institutional, academic, national or international fields. 
Fields can be defined as a configuration of objective relations between positions 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 20). It therefore exists independently of agents - imposing its 
structure on them - but is not deterministic in the sense that it is formed by agents who invest 
properties in them (Bigo 2011, 239). As European expertise is analyzed here as a field, it is 
important to note that this concept is not dependent on a level of analysis; fields focus on the 
“„totality of relations‟ involving the positions that are uncovered, structured, and 
conceptualized in the field” (Pouliot and Mérand 2013, 32). In other words, “the field 
description depends on the specificities of the group investigated” (Bigo 2011, 239).  
Fields can be strong or weak, autonomous or dominated (Bigo 2011, 239). When 
fields have clear rules of the game, clearly demarcated borers, and struggles around stakes 
that are sufficiently understood by actors, a field can be called a strong and autonomous field 
(Pouliot and Mérand 2011, 34). This study, however, hypothesizes that the European field of 
terrorism expertise should be interpreted as a “weak field” (Vauchez 2008; 2011), i.e. a “field 
which is completely immerged into other fields that are mapped out and constituted more 
firmly” (Topalov 1994, 464). Opposite to strong fields as isolated and self-sufficient social 
universes which imposes certain logics on its occupants, a weak field is heterogeneous and 
made up of agents whose characteristics are mostly structured outside the field in 
consideration (Vauchez 2008, 137). In the European field of expertise, therefore, it is 
expected that experts are largely dependent and dominated by the logics of neighboring fields, 
e.g. the academic field, the field of professionals of security, or the field of professionals of 
politics (Ragazzi 2013, 3).  
Because of this proximity to other fields, together with the fact that there are low 
barriers of entry (no institutionalized exams, tests or degrees), the European field of terrorism 
expertise is expected to serve a conversion of capitals for experts; actors from a variety of 
national fields invest in it to strengthen their expert and neutrality credentials (Vauchez 2008, 
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139). In other words, this study argues that the weak field of European expertise serves as a 
springboard for social mobilization; actors who normally do not have access (emerging or 
marginalized academics, minority NGOs, national civil servant) invest in networks at the 
level of the European Union, endowing them with capitals that they can subsequently reinvest 
in the (national) field of origin. Furthermore, from the perspective of the European Union, 
this study argues that European expert networks serve a function of legitimization; experts 
ensure validation and evidence for the radicalization frame established by the Commission 
(Ragazzi 2013, 3).  
 
4. Methodological Considerations 
When applying a Bourdieusian sociology one must take into account its relational 
ontology; the inextricable and interactive character between habitus and field, in which “a 
field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions anchored in certain 
forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations „deposited‟ 
within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, 
appreciation and action” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 16). It stems from Bourdieu‟s theory 
that any analysis of practices focuses on the apparent invisible relations between agents. As 
Bigo (2013, 124) describes: “bodies are not autonomous points, but relations to other points”. 
In other words, a Bourdieusian analysis on expert should not focus on properties of agents 
themselves, but on immanent relations in which they are embedded.  
With these theoretical considerations in mind, this study will analyze both stances 
(position-takings) of expert in question, in relation to the objective positions they occupy in 
the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 11). In practice, this requires – to paraphrase 
Bourdieu – a methodology that is able to “think” in terms of these relations. For this purpose 
three methods were used: Factorial Correspondence Analysis (FCA), Multiple 
Correspondence Analysis (MCA) and Social Network Analysis (SNA). These methods are 
“exploratory” in the sense that they do not need a priori expectations about relationships in 
the data (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010, 2). Instead, conclusions are established inductively 
from results by the apparent associations as a result of these analyses. In this way the methods 
used in this study differ from mainstream IR methodology in that it does not derive causality 
from a relationship between a pre-constructed dependent and independent variable. 
 The population for the analysis consists of all the authors of multiple reports provided 
by six European expert networks (Table 1). The first consists of seven reports published 
between 2009 and 2011 of the Policy Planner’s Network on Counter-Radicalization and 
Polarisation (PPN). The second is a 2008 report from the European Commision Expert 
Group on Violent Radicalization (ECEGVR). Other cases include four reports commissioned 
by the European Commission, which include a report by the Brussels-based think-tank CEIS 
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(2008), the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) 
based at Kings College in London (2008), and two reports from 2008 by the think-tank 
Change Institute, here distinguished as the “Beliefs” and “Best Practices” reports.  
  
TABLE 1 – Expert Network Reports  
PPN: 
- “Developing an Assessment Framework for (Muslim) Movement and Organisations”  (2009) 
- “Crisis Communications and Management: Discussion Document on Developing more Effective Strategies” 
(2009)   
- “Development of Religious Instruction and Institutions: „Imam Training‟ in Europe“ (2010) 
- “De-radicalization” (2010)   
- “Comparative Evaluation Framework for Counter Radicalization ” (2010) 
- “The Role of Civil Society in Counter-Radicalization and De-radicalization” (2010)   
- “Radicalization: The Role of the Internet” (2011)  
ECEGVR:  
- “ECEGVR Report” (2008)  
CEIS:   
- “Factors of Creation or Modification of Violent Radicalization Processes, Particularly Among the Youth” (2008) 
Change Institute:   
- “The Beliefs, Ideologies and Narratives of Violent Radicalization” (2008)  
- “Best Practices in Cooperation between Authorities and Civil Society with a view to the prevention and 
Response to Violent Radicalization” (2008)  
ICSR Kings College:  
- “Recruitment and Mobilisation for the Islamism Militant Movement in Europe” (2008) 
 
 In order to map out stances, discursive contents were established through coded 
reading of each expert report. Frequencies of codes were entered in a contingency table of 
which the content was then plotted using a Factorial Correspondence Analysis (FCA), a 
technique used to transform numerical data into a two-dimensional plane to allow for visual 
exploration of how expert reports relate to each of the specific stances. The positions of 
experts were plotted using a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), likewise a visual 
technique for exploring associations, but with a set of qualitative variables. The MCA will 
map capitals as variables (modalities) and project experts on a factorial space on the basis of 
these properties. For this an intermediary step was taken by mapping the underlying structure 
of expert relationships using a Social Network Analysis (SNA). With this method an index of 
centrality is calculated, capturing the “relative social capitals” of actors. These capitals were 
then used as an additional modality in the MCA.  
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5. Expert Stances  
 The first part of the analysis consists of a review of expert network stances with 
respect to the process of radicalization. Stances were recorded through coded readings of 
expert network documents. In the reports three themes seemed to reoccur: first, aspects of 
radicalization, concerning the notion of radicalization itself. It included what reports posited 
to be the main features, locations, ideological character, modalities of recruitment as well as 
the radicalization process itself. Second, factors of radicalization, based on the what the 
reports assumed the political, ideological, mobilizing, psycho-social and structural factors of 
radicalization. And last, recommendations for counter-radicalization grouped prescriptions, 
such as addressing root causes, community dialogue, counter-narratives, de-radicalization, 
education, hard policing, political engineering, research, learning, media and target location. 
  
FIGURE 2 – Aspects of Radicalization (R) – R stands for Radicalization. 
 
Because the FCA is a visual method that establishes associations between stances and 
expert networks, one can look for lines of demarcation, i.e. dimensions on the plot that 
indicate oppositions between expert network stances. These lines of demarcation allow for the 
identification of differences between expert network stances, which, in turn, enables 
assessment on the role and function of these expert networks. Additionally, as this study 
builds on the analysis carried out by Francesco Ragazzi (2013), it takes into account the effect 
the added expert network PPN has to the original results. 
The FCA in Figure 1 identifies a few oppositions that characterize the different 
stances in relation to the process of radicalization itself. These lines of demarcation are 
similar to the analysis without the PPN reports (Ragazzi 2013, 8-9). The first is based on the 
very notion of radicalization. The Kings College report, located at the left side of the FCA, 
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established a direct link between radical organizations (“gateway organizations”) and violent 
extremism. According to the report, these organizations “form part of a “conveyor belt” 
through which people get primed for their later involvement into terrorism”. On the opposite 
side are the reports that question the relevance of the term. The ECEGVR, in particular, took 
an adverse stance as it dismissed the very notion of radicalization. It argued that the term 
“violent radicalization” lacks academic currency and stated that “one of the most significant 
understandings gained from academic research over recent years is that individuals involved 
in terrorist activities exhibit a diversity of social backgrounds, undergo rather different 
processes of violent radicalization and are influenced by various combinations and 
motivations.”  
However, where the FCA without the PPN shows a clear opposition between the 
ECEGVR and the other reports (Ragazzi 2013, 8), the addition of the PPN stances has led to a 
redistribution the plot; the analysis shows that the PPN positions itself in clear opposition to 
the other networks. Located at the bottom-right of the plot, the PPN shared some of the 
skepticisms with its notions about “differing theories about when certain behaviors or 
attitudes become „dangerous‟.” The PPN stances are therefore not far removed from the 
ECEGVR stances. Unlike the EVEVGR, however, it did not dismiss the concept in its 
totality; the PPN underscored instead that “the way that radicalization [is] defined and 
interpreted in practice differs from place to place”, a stance that characterizes its role to 
provide for common ground in European counter-radicalization approaches.   
 A second line of opposition, overlapping the previous one between Kings College 
and the PPN, focuses on the role of the Internet in the radicalization process. According to the 
Kings College report, located on the left of the plot, the Internet plays a large role in 
radicalizing individuals. It argued that “the Internet can be dominant, if not the sole, factor 
that facilitates radicalization and recruitment.” On the other side is again the PPN. It 
disagreed with Kings College on the sole role of the Internet in the radicalization process, as 
it stated that “there are few examples of individuals radicalizing entirely online, but there are 
signs that this could increase over time” and emphasized that “offline socialization remains 
important.” The CEIS and Change Institute reports also acknowledge the increasing role of 
the internet and do not consider it a sole factor of the radicalization process. In the original 
study of Ragazzi (2013, 9) the CEIS and Change Institute reports are therefore opposed to the 
Kings College report. However, this line of demarcation has disappeared in current analysis 
as the PPN was added to the distribution.  
 A third line of demarcation is similar to the one identified in the original study 
(Ragazzi 2013, 9). It locates an opposition between a view on an ideological continuum 
between moderate and radical organizations. Located on top of the plot, both CEIS and 
Change Institute (“Beliefs”) supported the idea of a continuum, as illustrated by a link 
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between the Tabligh movement and Jihadi organizations: “the experience of militancy in a 
group like the „Tablighi‟, which has no political dimension but a sectarian functioning, can be 
influential in provoking attitudes and sentiments of frustration in which the more active 
means and ideologies of the militants may become of more interest.” Conversely, the 
networks that do not consider this continuum are located at the bottom of the plot. For 
example, the ECEGVR argued in line with its previous arguments, stating that “the espousal 
of a particular ideology does not guarantee that radicalization process will ensue […] and in 
fact previous studies of several European terrorist groups have made clear that ideology had a 
varying degree of relevance in that process.”   
 
FIGURE 2 – Factors causing Radicalization; R stands for Radicalization. 
 
The reports also contain different stances with regard to the factors causing 
radicalization (Figure 2).
 
With the exception of the ECEGVR, which had little to say about 
radicalization factors and is therefore located near the origin at the plot. The clearest line of 
demarcation in the plot is a strong opposition on the horizontal axis. Similar to the the FCA 
without the PPN (Ragazzi 2013, 10), the left side of the plot is occupied by the Change 
Institute (“Beliefs”) report that, somewhat in line with the ECEGVR, focused on “root causes” 
of radicalization. The reports emphasize contexts of social injustice with factors such as 
exclusion, racism and islamophobia as factors for radicalization. Radicalization is described 
as searching for political emancipation, reacting to foreign policy choices where no other 
political socialization is available. These stances are based on descriptions that carry agency, 
where radicalization is the result of a combination of structural factors and enabling 
circumstances. The views that contrast with these stances are depicted on the other side of the 
plot, describing individuals as devoid of agency. The PPN linked the radicalization-process to 
polarization in society and manipulation of vulnerable individuals, with special emphasis on 
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Internet accessibility.
 
And both Kings College and CEIS shared a focus on psychological 
features: phenomena that are linked to exploitation of identity conflicts.   
In contrast to the plot without the PPN - as given in the study of Ragazzi (2013, 10) - 
the lines of Figure 2 are less clearly demarcated. For instance, oppositions between the Kings 
College and CEIS report on the role of so-called "gateway organizations" have disappeared. 
In comparison to this plot it can therefore be argued that the addition of the PPN spoiled the 
existence of a clear vertical line of demarcation, of which the top part is now reserved for 
internet accessibility as a factor for radicalization. This can be explained as the PPN issued a 
report dedicated entirely to the subject of Internet radicalization; a bias that should be taken 
into account in future research.  
 
FIGURE 3 – Recommendations for Counter-Radicalization; CR stands for Counter-Radicalization 
 
Stances that concerned recommendations for counter-radicalization also establishes 
multiple dimensions (Figure 3). On the bottom of the vertical axis the ECEGVR dismissed 
the whole enterprise of counter-radicalization. It stated that there are no clear profiles of 
radicalization and argues that every process of radicalization is individual and contingent. 
However, the inclusion of the PPN in the plot disposes the clear demarcation between the 
ECEGVR and the other reports, as shown in the analysis without the PPN (Ragazzi 2013, 11). 
The PPN is positioned near the ECEGVR as it also dismissed a fixed one-size fits all policy. 
It added, however, a recommendation for counter-radicalization performance evaluation and 
exchange between national policy experiences with the goal to “speed up the learning process 
further, and develop understanding of the relative effectiveness different of types of national 
approaches.” Through this inclusion of the PPN, the ECEGVR is less isolated than in the 
original analysis (Ragazzi 2013, 11). This can be explained because the PPN shared some 
stances with the other expert networks. However, most these stances are opposed to the Kings 
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College report, located at the top of the plot, which emphasized a repressive approach with 
zero-tolerance, targeting gateway organizations and activists.   
 The second line of demarcation is on the horizontal axis. On the left side the 
recommendations addressing “root causes”, submitted by Change Institute (“Best Practices”) 
and CEIS. Both promoted to address discrimination, the diversity of research on Islam, 
ensuring broad political representation, and a focus on educational policies instead of security 
measures. Opposite to these stances, are measures focused on civil society organizations, 
associated with both PPN and Kings College. It includes building on social capitals of 
communities, relying on local governments, and focusing on the Internet.  
  
Multiple stances on radicalization and counter-radicalization 
The FCAs show different lines of demarcations through the inclusion of the PPN. 
However, the original conclusions remain intact (Ragazzi 2013, 12). The visual analysis of 
stances provided by the FCA points to a multiplicity of stances on violent-radicalization 
process as well as the best practices to prevent it. The results undermine the hypothesis that 
the EU terrorism expertise essentially serves a function of propaganda; a result most clearly 
illustrated by the ECEGVR as it dismissed the violent-radicalization frame of European 
Union policy. Similarly, the analysis dismisses the hypothesis that terrorist experts might 
form an “epistemic community”; the results indicate that experts do not share all of the four 
characteristics: principled beliefs about what is considered the right course of social and 
political action; causal beliefs about social and political phenomena; notions of validity about 
accepted and neutral knowledge; a common policy enterprise. The analysis shows instead a 
wide variety of discourses on the issue of radicalization and provides a range of policy-
advices to prevent it.  
In sum, the ECEGVR called into question the term of radicalization, describing it as a 
contingent process, and thus dismissed the possibility of a prevention-policy altogether. The 
PPN also called into question a definitive model of radicalization, but emphasized policy 
evaluation and learning, vigilance for Internet radicalization and civil society based solutions. 
Kings College focused on radicalizers manipulating vulnerable individuals calling it a 
“conveyor belt.” It advocated repressive and zero-tolerance prevention measures targeting 
organizations and ideologies, also in an online context. The CEIS identified radicalization as 
psychosocial phenomenon and advocated counter-measures based on addressing “root 
causes”. And last, the Change Institute described radicalization as an expression of political 
grief and also expressed that counter-terrorism policy should address “root causes”.  
 
6. Expert Positions  
 As the previous section provided an indication of expert stances on the topic of 
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radicalization, this next section will move to an analysis of the positions from which these 
views are expressed. Taken together it allows for a reconstruction between what experts 
express in their documents and their own strategic positions. This next section is divided into 
two parts. The first part utilizes a Social Network Analysis in order to derive the relative 
social capitals of experts. The second part will consist of a Multiple Correspondence Analysis, 
enabling a two-dimensional representation of the distribution of social, academic and 
institutional capitals and the interrelationships between stances and positions. 
 
Social Network Analysis.  
 Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be used as a methodological tool to organize 
relational data. “It detects patterns of relations within a social space, thereby creating a 
representation of social structure through interactions within the field” (De Nooy 2003, 323). 
From a Bourdieusian perspective, it provides an indication of social capitals as “the sum of 
the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group by virtue of possessing 
a durable network of a more or less institutionalized relationship of mutual acquaintance and 
recognition” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 119). In other words, the larger number of social 
ties, the more social power the expert possesses (De Nooy 2003, 325).  
The intention of the SNA here is to derive the relative social capital of each expert 
(Ragazzi 2013, 13). Relative social capital is different to social capital in that it is determined 
by the degree of centrality, that is, the relative importance of an organization, actor or report 
measured by the amount of connections. For this purpose the size of the nodes represent the 
Eigenvector Centrality value
4
; it measures the importance of a node in a network in relation to 
the wider network. In other words, the bigger the node, the more central the actor, and the 
more social capital it possesses from a Bourdieusian point of view.   
 The data used to graph the social network consists of the authors who contributed to 
the reports and their biographical data – current and past educational and institutional 
background. The resulting network is shown in Figures 4 and 5, which map the authors of the 
reports as well as their connection through multiple memberships. The reports are colored red, 
organizations dark blue and individuals light blue. In addition, numbers are given to experts 
that are grouped together to facilitate the reading of the SNA. Figure 4 displays the 
connections through the authorships of the reports, while Figure 5 displays the same 
connections but without the reports in order to see how experts are connected without their 
mutual authorships.  
 
 
                                                        
4 As opposed to measures of Betweenness or Closeness Centrality, the Eigenvector Centrality allows for an account of the 
number of connections between each node as well as the importance of each node in relation to its position in the wider network. 
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FIGURE 4 – Social Network Analysis of experts with reports  
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FIGURE 5 – Social Network Analysis of experts without the reports   
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 As the SNA uses the same data of expert network members as Francesco Ragazzi's 
study (2013), the sociograms displayed in figure 4 and 5 distinguish similar groupings - 
although some interconnections and centrality indexes have shifted by the added data of the 
PPN members. The PPN members are located at the center of the SNA (Figure 4 no. 1), 
which consists of 66 connected agents. Because the network consists of a large number of 
ministry-related personnel, many of the nodes surrounding the PPN report consist of 
individuals closely knitted together by their membership of European ministries, consisting 
mostly individuals from the UK (Communities and Local Government, Home Office) and the 
Netherlands (Ministry of Security and Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) but also from 
Sweden (Ministry of Justice) and Denmark (Ministry of Integration and Ministry of Interior). 
Leaning to the left side are the PPN reports‟ contributors associated with NGOs and think-
tanks (Institute of Strategic Dialogue, Institute for Strategic Studies and Demos), Muslim civil 
society organizations and Islamic research institutes such as the School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS London) (Figure 4 no. 2). PPN contributors also seem to group 
themselves at the bottom of the sociogram (Gaume, Godard, Senat, Schlumberger) (Figure 4 
no. 3). These consist of multi-positioned, high ranked, security experienced officials, that 
share memberships in Bureau Central des Cultes, Paris Police, Ministry of Defense, Ministry 
of Interior and an educational background at L'Institut d'Études Politiques (IEP Paris/Sciences 
PO).  
The degree of centrality of PPN members is quite large in the sociogram of Figure 4, 
but this is caused primarily by the high number of membership connections through the PPN. 
Figure 5 therefore shows the same SNA without the reports. It redistributes connections 
between particular national ministries: a large group of UK experts in the middle of the 
sociogram (Figure 5 no. 1), the Dutch ministry related individuals pushed to the top (Figure 5 
no. 2), and the French contributors isolated at the bottom of the plot (Figure 5 no. 3). The 
result is lower degrees of relative social capitals for ministry related actors, but higher on the 
part of NGO and Muslim civil society organization members (Briggs, Hussain and Abdul 
Azis) (Figure 5 no. 4).   
 The second group that can be distinguished from the sociogram is the authors of the 
ECEGVR report, located at the top left of both Figure 4 (no. 4) and 5 (no. 5). It comprises a 
group of multi-positioned experts, sharing memberships in leading research institutions (St. 
Andrew‟s University Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence CSTPV, 
Leiden University and Kings College London), high-level policy institutions (United Nations 
Terrorism prevent Branch UN-TPB and the World Economic Forum WEF), and European 
expert networks (European Network of Experts on Radicalization ENER, The European 
Radicalization Awareness Network EU-Ran and the European Expert Network on Terrorism 
Issues EENET). Author Rogers establishes a link between Kings College Report (Neumann 
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2008 report) and the ECEGVR report. Furthermore, Neumann and Rogers are marginally 
connected through Neumann‟s connection to some of the European expert networks (START, 
ENER, CGCC and EENET). In Figure 5, the sociogram without the reports, displays a 
reinforcement of the centrality of the multi-positioned experts such as Coolsaet, de Vries, 
Ranstorp, Schmid and Silke.  
 The third group that can be distinguished in the sociogram is that of the authors of the 
Change Institute reports (“Best practice” and “Beliefs”). As Figure 4 illustrates (no. 5), and 
Figure 5 emphasizes (no. 6), is that this subgroup of experts consists of a loose coalition of 
individuals, who share few organizations beyond the same report. The groups consist mostly 
of academics at universities (University of Grenada, Babes Bolyai University, Grenoble II 
University) and members of anti-discrimination and Muslim civil society organizations 
(Muslim Academy, Muslim Omroep, Muslim Policy Forum, National Muslim Women 
Advisory Group). The exception being authors Muller, Hilali, Fiaz, Birt and Dijkman who 
share connections with the other networks; Muller and Birts present more policy oriented 
memberships connected to the ECEGVR, Dijkman being also a contributor in the PPN reports. 
 Last, the CEIS-group seems isolated and unconnected to the rest of the network 
(Figure 4 no. 6 and Figure 5 no. 7). It consists of authors located in the journalism field (Le 
Monde, Diplomatique, El Globo), two academics (University of Warwick and University of 
Girona) and the director of the CEIS think-tank, Dyevre.  
 
Multiple Correspondence Analysis  
Because the Social Network Analysis (SNA) remains a one-dimensional analysis – it 
does not reveal much about other structuring properties beyond social capitals – this next 
section moves on to a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). Just like in the FCA the 
MCA allows to understand the content of the associations among (qualitative) variables by 
visualizing it on a two-dimensional plane. The MCA, however, allows for an identification of 
social patterns by the interrelation between multiple social elements (modalities), i.e. patterns 
of relationships between both the position-takings and positions of experts (Pouliot 2013, 54).  
 In the MCA, modalities that co-occur relatively often are drawn closely together and 
modalities that co-occur less often are drawn apart. The Bourdieusian logic is that it is 
deemed meaningful that one property usually entails another and excludes a third: “people are 
supposed to think in terms of distinctive properties or intuitively recognize them” (De Nooy 
2003, 309). In addition, the dimensions of the map can be interpreted as the order of the space 
represented (De Nooy 2003, 309). In other words, dimensions represent the “objective social 
structure” Bourdieu speaks of, i.e. the distribution of the relevant types of capital or power. 
As the MCA in this study adds the PPN to the analysis, three dimensions are revealed to be 
relevant - this in contrast with the two dimension found in the paper of Ragazzi (2013). 
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The sample of experts in all the European expert network reports consists of 111 
individuals.
5
 Countries represented are mostly Northern European countries such as the UK 
(29%), Sweden (6,3%), Spain (5,4%), the Netherlands (9,9%), Germany (6,4%), France (9%), 
Denmark (7,2%) and Belgium (5,4%). 51,8% holds a Ph.D, 41% a Bachelor and/or Master. In 
the academic disciplines that are represented, political science dominates (32,5%), along with 
law (9,6%), oriental studies (8,4%) and sociology (8,4%). Experts are generally nationally 
rooted in higher education, 68,7% obtained their degrees in their countries of origin and 
26,5% abroad. Furthermore, 25,3% hold an academic position, 36,2% is NGO member or 
director, 65,1% have no policy experience, 4,8% have no political experience and 83,1% have 
no security experience.  
 Individuals are mapped on a plot on the basis of their academic capital (H-index6, 
academic title, highest degree, field of highest degree) and institutional capital (previous 
policy experience, previous political experience, previous security experience and previous 
NGO experience). In addition, the “relative social capital” provided by the social network 
analysis is coded in the variable “centrality index” and added as separate modalities (central, 
average and marginal centrality).  
The MCA produces multiple factorial axes on which the expert network reports and 
their authors are distributed according to their characteristics. In total there were 34 active 
modalities. As the axes were ranked in decreasing order of importance, the first three axes are 
used for this study (Appendix Table 2). As a baseline criterion for retaining the modalities for 
interpretation of an axis it was decided to take modalities that exceed the average contribution 
(100/34 = 2,94%). The modalities that exceeded this baseline criterion and their contribution 
are shown below: 
 Axis 1: Former high rank official (14,30%), Security Agency Experience (4,3%), Average H-
index (7,39%), High H-index (9.34%), No H-index (4.86), No Ministry (3, 74%), Bachelor & 
Masters degree (4,23%), PhD. (5,4%), Full Professor (6,49%), No Academic Position (6,12%), 
Centrality (9,33%) and marginal centrality (2,92%) 
 Axis 2: High rank Official (17,13%) No policy Experience (4,28%), Political Experience 
(8,08%), Security Agency Experience (11,96%), Average H-index (2,95%), NGO Think Tank 
(3,17%), Lecturer (4,60%), Full Professor (15,39%).  
 Axis 3: International Education (5,29%), National Education (4,22%), Midrank Official 
(5.02%), Political Experience (3,29%), NGO member (6,39%), No NGO Experience (5,72%), 
NGO director (5,60%), Justice (9,19%), Not Ministry (12,67%), NGO-think-tank (6,34%), No 
Degree (16,85%), Lecturer (3,00%).  
                                                        
5 Because the PPN sample was incomplete, missing values were replaced by the mean of samples that were available. 
6 The H-index was calculated using the software Publish, which calculates H-indexes on the basis of Google Scholar citations. It 
was then categorized as three separate modalities: Central, Average and Marginal centrality.  
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FIGURE 6 – Multiple Correspondence Analysis of active modalities in axes 1 and 2 
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FIGURE 7 – Multiple Correspondence Analysis of authors on axes 1 and 2, distributed by individual capitals  
  23 
FIGURE 8 – Multiple Correspondence Analysis of active modalities in axes 2 and 3 
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 Axis 1 and 2 are displayed in Figure 6 and 7 - Figure 6 shows the distribution of the 
active modalities, Figure 7 shows the distribution of authors on the same axes. Axis 1 is 
foremost an academic capital axis. On the left side of axis 1 are four modalities which 
indicate low educational capitals (no academic position, no H-index, Ba&Ma), and marginal 
centrality. On the right side eight modalities indicate higher educational capitals (Ph.D, full 
professor, centrality, average and high H-indexes) together with non-ministry positions and 
security agency experience. Axis 2 distributes individuals at upper section of the plot with 
high levels of institutional capital (political experience, high rank official, security agency 
experience, lecturer), opposed by four modalities at the bottom that indicate non-institutional 
positions (no policy experience, NGO/think tank experience, full professor, average H-index). 
Axis 2 is therefore primarily an institutional capital axis.  
Figure 8 shows axes 2 and 3. Axis 2 is the same axis as in Figure 6, which is now 
displayed horizontally. Displayed vertically, axis 3 shows modalities on the lower part of the 
plot that refers to NGO experience (NGO – think-tank, NGO director, not ministry). It 
associates with international education and no educational degree. On the upper part of the 
plot are five modalities that indicate to an absence of NGO experience (no NGO experience, 
mid-rank official, lecturer, national education and justice ministry position). Axis 3 is 
therefore primarily an NGO capital dimension.  
 The ECEGVR and its critical stance on radicalization is positioned at the lower right 
in the plot of Figure 6 and the left side of Figure 8. It indicates that ECEGVR experts possess 
high amounts of academic capital in relation to the other networks (81,8% of the members 
hold a Ph.D. and are full professors, 36,4% were educated abroad) and some institutional 
capitals (36% are former high rank officials). These findings are also evident in Figure 7, 
which distributes most of the individual authors on the bottom. The Kings College report, 
with its emphasis on „conveyor belt‟ radicalization and Internet radicalization, also consists of 
actors with high amounts of academic capitals (75% are full professors), and are therefore 
positioned on the far left side in Figure 8. They are also positioned lower in Figure 6 and 7 
because they have fewer institutional experiences in relation to the other networks.  
 These findings more or less correspond with the MCA without the PPN members, 
provided in the paper of Francesco Ragazzi (2013, 18); the authors of both the aberrant 
ECEGVR and Kings College reports are positioned having relatively more capitals than 
members of the other networks. However, a difference is that in the MCA of this study the 
ECEGVR is not positioned high on the institutional capital dimension. This can be explained 
by its separate modality of "former high ranked official", which does not appear in 
correspondence with "midrank official" and "highrank official" modalities - which many 
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members of the PPN possess. Future research should probably take this issue into account, for 
example by joining these modalities.  
 Authors of the Change Institute (“Beliefs” and “Practices”), CEIS and PPN are 
clumped together on the left side of the origin in Figure 6, as they both associated with lower 
academic and institutional capitals. Figure 8 positions them near the origin. This impedes the 
interpretation of differences, especially when compared with the analysis without the PPN 
(Ragazzi 2013, 18). However, the results still more or less concur with the original study, as it 
uses the same data. Change Institute (“Best Practices”), with its emphasis on „root causes‟ has 
distinct NGO profiles (55,2%), together with low academic capitals (55,2% have no academic 
position, 10,3% no academic degree). The CEIS report, with its emphasis on psycho-social 
factors of radicalization with a focus on eliminating root causes, consists of marginal 
academics; they have no or very low H-index scores and marginal centrality scores. 
Furthermore, its authors are mostly national educated (100%) and have no experience in 
NGOs, policy or political positions (100%).  
 The PPN members are positioned relatively close to the CEIS and Change Institute 
reports, although on average their position on both the academic and institutional capital axes 
are higher. With its emphasis European cooperation, learning, Internet and community based 
action, seems to consist for a large part of ministry related personnel (high rank official 27%, 
mid rank official 35,1%), for a large part coming from national ministries of interior and 
integration. Furthermore it consists of relatively high-educated authors (51,4% holding a 
Ph.D.), but 64,9% hold no academic position and 64,9% do not have NGO positions. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion 
Both the analysis of the stances and the analysis of the social positions dismiss 
interpretations provided by the “propagandist” and “epistemic communities” hypotheses. The 
addition of the PPN has not changed this conclusion. The analysis of expert network stances 
indicates to multiple narratives on the characterization of violent-radicalization as well as the 
recommendations to prevent it from taking place. From these results it can be concluded that 
European expert networks do not necessarily align themselves with policy drawn by 
governing elites, but have in fact “distinct cards to play”. In addition, the results seem to 
indicate that experts cannot be interpreted as an epistemic community as they do not form a 
common body of knowledge nor share equal strategies; experts display instead a wide variety 
of stances and strategies might equally differ.  
When expert stances are analyzed in conjunction with the social positions they take in 
the field, the results point to a number of insights that might provide ground for further 
research. For instance, this study confirms the hypothesis that the European field of expertise 
is a “weak field” i.e. a field that is dominated by other more autonomous fields. This is most 
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clearly corroborated by the example of the ECEGVR. The analysis shows that this expert 
group consists of the most multi-positioned group as they have a vast trajectory in both 
academic and institutional fields. Together with their critical stances on the issue of violent-
radicalization it could arguably be that these capitals provided them with enough legitimacy 
to counter-balance the radicalization direction set out by the EU without losing their status as 
experts. In addition, it can be argued that the ECEGVR‟s proximity to the field of security 
and politics made them unwilling to endorse the radicalization turn of the EU (Ragazzi 2013, 
21).  
However, as this critical stance provides an indication of the weak autonomy of the 
field of expertise vis-à-vis the field of politics or security, the weak field hypothesis may 
further be confirmed by the fact that the Commission had rejected the report of the ECEGVR; 
because the report did not validate the violent-radicalization discourse, the Commission did 
not consider these experts as legitimate voices to define what the “real threat” is. The 
Commission looked therefore to other sources of expertise, finding it with expert networks 
that did not have a traditional security profile. These sources of expertise could arguably have 
been found in reports provided by the PPN, Kings College, CEIS and Change Institute, as 
their stances indicate that they (re)produced a soft-line and community-based discourse that 
was acceptable within the discourse of the Commission.  
More evidence for the “weak field” hypothesis can be found when looking from the 
perspective of actors who invest in the European field of expertise. The experts‟ stances in 
relation to social positions may indicate to a function of conversion of capitals; those who 
have low institutional capitals or limited academic recognition could invest in a European 
network of expertise to provide them with capitals at the European level. For instance, the 
Kings College report seems to consist mainly of experts with high valued academic capitals 
but considerably low institutional capitals. Their access to the field of expertise could indicate 
to a personal strategy to gain acknowledgement as a legitimate voice in European terrorism 
field. This might also explain their hardline stances on the topic of counter-radicalization, as 
they were dominated by and tried to secure support of the political and/or security field. A 
similar strategy of conversion of capitals can also be identified with the authors of the CEIS 
and Change Institute reports. These actors had limited social capitals, academically marginal 
positions and were often positioned in civil society institutions. Because of these scarce 
capitals it could equally be argued that their access to European field of expertise served them 
the means to gain institutional and international capitals, thereby endowing them with more 
legitimacy and prestige that, in turn, could be reinvested in the field of origin. 
 And last, the authors of the PPN consist of a large and diverse group of experts. A 
large group is located in national bureaucratic fields (e.g. ministries of interior and 
integration). They therefore show more institutional capitals in relation to other networks. As 
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stances of the PPN seem more or less in line with those of the European Union, this might be 
explained by the positioning of experts in national bureaucratic fields of countries that 
affiliated with the counter-radicalization turn in the EU - for instance, a large part of 
bureaucrats come from the UK and the Netherlands, where counter-radicalization is the 
dominant paradigm. Even the position of experts from France, a country that officially does 
not recognize counter-radicalization as a policy-direction, seem to be located in more 
moderate positions of their national fields (e.g. Bureau des Cultes, France). A large part of the 
experts, however, also have low academic capitals and marginal institutional capitals 
(midrank officials) and predominantly positioned in national fields. Investment at the level of 
the European Union might therefore equally serve a strategy to gain capitals at the European 
level. In addition, the group of NGO members in the PPN might also perform a strategy of 
acknowledgement by cooperating in this European field of expertise. 
 The conclusions in this study may provide grounds for further research. First of all, 
more expert networks could be explored, such as the more established EU bodies (Europol, 
Eurojust, EPCTF and SitCen), formal and informal groups (CTG, PWGT and G6) and 
additional experts such as the Network of Experts on Radicalization (ENER) and the 
Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). Second, further research could focus more on the 
individual specificities of experts by including individual stances of experts instead of 
collective stances through expert reports used here. Third, more biographical data could be 
added to get better sense of the positions from which the experts express their view - for 
example, by a more thorough method of prosopography or qualitative interviews with experts. 
And last, additional hypotheses could be drawn for European terrorism expertise. For 
example, it may be argued that experts‟ access to European fields may function an 
import/export strategy (Dezalay and Garth 2011), or the analysis could include a hypothesis 
of a (trans)national field of power (Bourdieu 1994; Bigo 2011, 246). 
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Appendix 
 
TABLE 2:  
Contribution of the active modalities - in bold, contributions of categories for the interpretation of each axis (>2.94). 
 
 
Relative Weight 
(%) 
Square of the 
distance from 
the origin 
Axis   1 Axis   2 Axis   3 
Academic Education (Inter)national      
International Education 2.523 2.96429 2.35 0.55 5.29 
National Education 7.207 0.38750 0.58 0.31 4.22 
TOTAL 9.730  2.93 0.86 9.51 
Policy Experience      
Former High Rank Off 0.631 14.85710 14.30 0.01 1.31 
Highrank Official 1.171 7.53846 1.58 17.13 1.09 
Midrank Official 1.441 5.93750 0.93 0.49 5.02 
No Policy Experience 6.757 0.48000 1.52 4.28 1.25 
TOTAL 10.000  18.33 21.91 8.68 
Political Experience      
No Political Experie 9.640 0.03738 0.02 0.30 0.12 
Political Experience 0.360 26.75000 0.65 8.08 3.29 
TOTAL 10.000  0.68 8.38 3.41 
Security Experience      
No Security Experien 8.468 0.18085 0.78 2.16 0.03 
Security Agency Expe 1.532 5.52941 4.30 11.96 0.17 
TOTAL 10.000  5.08 14.12 0.20 
HC-Index      
Very Low H-Index 3.063 2.26471 0.09 0.72 0.16 
Low H-Index 0.811 11.33330 0.41 0.89 0.69 
Average H-Index 0.631 14.85710 7.39 2.95 0.02 
High H-Index 0.721 12.87500 9.34 0.15 0.00 
No H-Index 4.775 1.09434 4.86 1.14 0.52 
TOTAL 10.000  22.09 5.85 1.39 
NGO Experience      
NGO member 1.982 4.04545 2.19 0.14 6.39 
No NGO Experience 6.757 0.48000 0.35 0.06 5.72 
NGO Director 1.261 6.92857 0.23 1.10 5.60 
TOTAL 10.000  2.78 1.30 17.71 
Ministry Types      
Interior 2.793 2.58065 1.71 1.70 0.44 
Communities and Loca 1.712 4.84211 1.49 2.45 0.00 
Justice 1.351 6.40000 0.44 0.06 9.19 
Not_Ministry 1.261 6.92857 3.74 0.03 12.67 
NGO - Think Tank 0.901 10.10000 0.15 3.17 6.34 
Integration 1.081 8.25000 2.70 1.20 2.66 
Other 0.901 10.10000 0.01 8.80 0.00 
TOTAL 10.000  10.24 17.42 31.31 
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Max Degree 
BA & MA 4.505 1.22000 4.23 0.76 0.18 
No Degree 0.450 21.20000 1.72 0.03 16.85 
Ph.D. 5.045 0.98214 5.46 0.77 2.66 
TOTAL 10.000  11.41 1.56 19.70 
Academic Position      
Lecturer 2.252 3.44000 0.69 4.60 3.00 
Full Professor 2.793 2.58065 6.49 15.39 0.43 
No Academic Position 4.955 1.01818 6.12 2.25 2.76 
TOTAL 10.000  13.30 22.24 6.18 
Centrality (qualitative)      
Central 2.252 3.44000 9.33 2.41 1.47 
Average Centrality 6.036 0.65672 0.91 2.52 0.40 
Marginal 1.712 4.84211 2.92 1.44 0.04 
TOTAL 10.000  13.17 6.36 1.91 
 
